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DAKOTA BRADLEY, a Minor, by and through his Mother 
and Natural Guardian, SANDRA MILLER; 
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DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; OWEN SCHEER; 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants, Sandra Miller, her three children (Corey 
Miller, Thomas Miller and Dakota Bradley), and their 
attorney, David Deratzian, Esq., sued the City of 
Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Department of Human 
Services ("DHS"), DHS social worker Owen Scheer 
(collectively, the "City defendants"), the Children's Hospital 
of Philadelphia ("CHOP") and two CHOP security guards 
(collectively, the "CHOP defendants"), alleging violations of 
their procedural and substantive due process rights under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 and asserting various claims under state 
law.1 The claims arise from an emergency ex parte child 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Deratzian, who represents Appellants in this appeal, alleged a 
violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights, as well as assault and 
battery by the CHOP security guards. However, Deratzian did not appeal 
from the grant of summary judgment for the defendants; therefore, his 
claims are not before us. 
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custody hearing after which the City defendants removed 
two of Miller's children from her custody. The District Court 
dismissed the procedural due process claim and granted 
summary judgment on the remaining claims. Appellants 
raise issues related to their procedural and substantive due 
process claims and assert that the District Court engaged 
in improper credibility determinations. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Tiny Tot Daycare personnel reported to Scheer their 
suspicion that Corey and Thomas Miller were victims of 
abuse. Scheer and Reginald Jackson, another DHS social 
worker, visited the day care center. Thomas and Corey each 
indicated that they had been hit by both their mother and 
her boyfriend, Derrick Schill. The owner of the day care 
center informed the social workers that previous injuries to 
the children had concerned the day care workers and that 
the center had videotaped some of the injuries. The next 
day, Scheer and Jackson returned to the center with 
Scheer's supervisor. Corey and Thomas repeated their 
statements. At his supervisor's request, Scheer then had 
the Miller children brought to CHOP for an examination. 
 
Dr. Henretig, a CHOP physician, examined the children 
that evening and reported to Scheer, Jackson, social worker 
Amy Frank, and Deratzian that he had found no evidence 
of injury to Thomas or Dakota, but had found bruises on 
Corey and felt that a mark on Corey's back was suspicious. 
Dr. Henretig indicated that the mark had been made within 
the last twenty-four hours; however, he could not be certain 
whether Corey's injuries resulted from abuse or accident. 
 
Scheer then called Assistant City Solicitor Debra Maser 
and told her what Dr. Henretig had said and what he had 
learned in his investigation. Maser next spoke with Dr. 
Henretig and then contacted an on-call emergency judge 
seeking an order to remove Miller's children from her 
custody, which the judge issued. At some point after 
Scheer's conversation with Maser, but before the order was 
issued, Scheer met with Dr. Henretig outside of the 
presence of Frank and Deratzian. Thereafter, the doctor 
issued a report of suspected abuse. 
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Approximately thirty-six hours after the removal order 
was issued, a detention hearing was held to determine 
whether the children should continue to remain in DHS 
custody. Before adjourning for the weekend, the attorney 
representing Miller at the hearing (not Deratzian) requested 
that Thomas Miller be released but conceded that a prima 
facie case of dependency had been established as to Corey. 
Thomas was returned to his mother's custody, but the 
judge upheld the restraining order and kept Corey in the 
custody of the state. Following a second day of testimony 
the next Monday, the judge dissolved the restraining order 
and returned Corey to his mother's custody, with the 
condition that Schill have no contact with Mrs. Miller or the 
children until a dependency hearing could be held to 
determine who should take custody of the children. Scheer 
was later reassigned from the Miller case. Thereafter, DHS 
sporadically pursued a dependency action against Miller, 
but ultimately dissolved the petition. 
 
In their suit, Appellants alleged that Scheer violated their 
rights to procedural due process by refusing to allow them 
to participate in his telephone conversation with the City 
Solicitor. They alleged that he violated their rights to 
substantive due process by pursuing the investigation 
without probable cause, misrepresenting facts to Solicitor 
Maser, inducing CHOP to falsify records, and attempting to 
suborn perjury by Dr. Henretig.2 
 
The District Court dismissed, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), Appellants' procedural due process claim against 
the City defendants and held that Scheer had qualified 
immunity from Appellants' substantive due process claims 
to the extent that they alleged he pursued the Millers' case 
without probable cause. The Court declined, however, to 
dismiss the section 1983 substantive due process claims 
against Scheer for allegedly misrepresenting Dr. Henretig's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In addition, they alleged civil rights, conspiracy, malicious 
prosecution, bodily injury and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress 
claims. Miller and Deratzian also alleged civil rights claims against the 
City and DHS independently for their policies and customs and for 
failure to adequately train their staff. The plaintiffs did not appeal 
from 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment on those claims, so 
those claims are not before us. 
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medical report, inducing the hospital to falsify records and 
attempting to suborn perjury. In doing so, the Court held 
that Scheer had neither absolute nor qualified immunity 
against these charges. The Court declined to dismiss the 
balance of the claims against the City. See Miller v. City of 
Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
[hereinafter Miller I]. 
 
Following discovery, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for defendants on Appellants' claims against 
DHS, their state law claims against the City, their section 
1983 substantive due process claim and malicious 
prosecution claims against Scheer, and their section 1983 
substantive due process and malicious prosecution claim 
against the City to the extent that those claims related to 
Scheer. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.96- 
3578, 1997 WL 476352, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1997) 
[hereinafter Miller II]. After this order was entered, 
Appellants did not oppose motions for summary judgment 
by the CHOP defendants3 and by the City defendants on the 
remaining claims against them. The Millers now contend 
that the District Court erred by dismissing their procedural 
due process claim, by granting qualified immunity to 
Scheer, and by making impermissible credibility 
determinations. 
 
II. Procedural Due Process 
 
The first issue is narrow. Although Appellants argue that 
their procedural due process rights were violated, they do 
not challenge the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 
statute that sets forth the procedure to be followed in 
emergency child custody hearings,4 nor do they contend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Millers' claims against the CHOP defendants, based on an alleged 
conspiracy with the City defendants, were not addressed in the 
statement of issues in Appellants' brief or in the briefs themselves. 
Although Appellants asserted at oral argument that these claims were 
being appealed, we hold that they have been waived. See Southwestern 
Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("[A]ppellate courts generally should not address legal issues that the 
parties have not developed through proper briefing."). 
 
4. Initiating child custody proceedings by ex parte orders is generally 
constitutional if a prompt post-deprivation hearing is held. See, e.g., 
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that DHS personnel failed to follow the statutory 
procedures for taking a child into custody. Instead, 
Appellants contend that the procedures adopted by DHS to 
implement the state statute are faulty because they did not 
ensure that either Miller or Deratzian, who were both 
present at the hospital and therefore clearly available, had 
the opportunity to participate in the emergency hearing 
before the judge. Our review of the District Court's decision 
to dismiss is plenary. In our view, this argument fails to 
raise a valid procedural due process claim. 
 
Appellants contend that when a parent, or the parent's 
attorney, is available when the government applies for a 
restraining order, the government must allow the parent or 
the attorney to take part in the hearing. Such a 
requirement, they argue, would protect the parent's interest 
in the custody of their child without any significant burden 
on the government. 
 
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965)). 
Assessing whether due process has been given involves a 
weighing of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews: 
 
       first, the private interest that will be affected by the 
       official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
       deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 343 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Due process . . . 
does not always require prior process."); Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 787 
F.2d 403, 408 (8th Cir. 1986). Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services 
Law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6301 et seq., and Juvenile Court Act, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6301 et seq., require that a hearing be held within 
seventy-two hours after an ex parte hearing that results in a child's 
removal from the home. See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6315(d); 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6332(a). Although we have not considered 
Pennsylvania's statutory procedure, district courts in this circuit have 
found it constitutional. See Miller I, 954 F. Supp. at 1061 (citing 
various 
cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). 
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       used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
       substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
       Government's interest, including the function involved 
       and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
       additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
       entail. 
 
Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903. 
 
The private interest at stake springs from the parent- 
child relationship. The Supreme Court has recognized a 
"fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child." Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 
(1982); see also Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & 
Youth Serv., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). This 
interest, however, must be balanced against the state's 
interest in protecting children suspected of being abused. 
See, e.g., Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125; Millspaugh v. County 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172, 1175-77 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
 
Appellants assert that ensuring that a parent (or her 
representative) will be heard under the instant 
circumstances would create little cost for the state. They 
point to the required flexibility of the due process standard 
for support. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S. Ct. at 902 
(" `[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.' " (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 
2600 (1972))). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, 
that "[t]he interpretation and application of the Due Process 
clause are intensely practical matters," Gross v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 578, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738 (1975) (emphasis added), 
and we must consider the results that a ruling for the 
Appellants here would have on all ex parte child custody 
hearings. 
 
Here, the cost to the state is not the minimal one that 
Appellants suggest. The District Court specifically 
considered the practicality of requiring "the government to 
adopt special procedures depending on who was within the 
vicinity of the government official when he or she requests 
an emergency restraining order." Miller I, 954 F. Supp. at 
1062. 
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       [Appellants'] proposed procedure would require case- 
       by-case analysis, and would raise new issues such as 
       the nature of the pre-deprivation hearing that the state 
       would have to provide and when exactly a parent was 
       available on site. Pre-deprivation hearings would 
       frustrate the purpose of the Juvenile Act and would 
       bog down the statute with "procedural technicalities 
       and costly litigation." Consequently, although it may be 
       preferable for DHS to allow the parent to participate in 
       the request for an emergency order when he or she is 
       present, the facts as alleged by plaintiffs do not 
       establish a constitutional violation of the right to 
       procedural due process. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
We agree. Although Appellants' argument is intuitively 
appealing, its strength lies in its pragmatic nature rather 
than its constitutional validity. We do not discount parents' 
strong interest in the custody of their children, but 
requiring that a parent or his attorney be included in 
emergency pre-deprivation hearings "when available" or 
"when at hand" would build delay into these time-sensitive 
hearings and encourage litigation over "availability." Such a 
requirement would thus inhibit, deter and, at times, 
subvert the crucial function of ex parte custody hearings -- 
protecting children who are in imminent danger of harm. 
We therefore conclude that the holding sought by 
Appellants would create a burden on the state that would 
not be justified by commensurate relief to the affected 
parents' rights. 
 
III. Substantive Due Process 
 
Appellants next challenge the District Court's dismissal 
of their substantive due process claim. The District Court 
held that Scheer was protected by qualified immunity 
against the claim that he pursued the investigation without 
probable cause.5 In its ruling, the court declined to apply 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court denied Scheer qualified immunity for other acts 
alleged by Appellants, including misrepresenting Dr. Henretig's report to 
the City Solicitor and attempting to suborn perjury by the doctor. We 
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our decision in Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & 
Youth Serv., 103 F.3d at 1123. Our review of this decision 
is also plenary. 
 
By basing the dismissal on qualified immunity-- an 
affirmative defense -- the District Court presumed the 
validity of the alleged due process violation. The proper 
approach, however, is to ascertain whether a constitutional 
violation has been alleged before determining if qualified 
immunity is available. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 
232, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991); Larsen v. Senate of the 
Commonwealth of Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("[W]hen a qualified immunity defense is raised a court first 
should determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a 
violation of a constitutional right at all."). 
 
As noted, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
"fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child." Santosky, 455 
U.S. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95; see also Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 
(1983). We, and other courts of appeals, have recognized 
this as a protectable interest. See, e.g., Croft, 103 F.3d at 
1125; Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
agree with the Court's holding that, even if Scheer did misrepresent the 
doctor's report to Solicitor Maser, Appellants failed to establish a 
causal 
connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the Judge's 
decision to grant a separation order. See Miller II, 1997 WL 476352, at 
*4. Our precedents establish the necessity of a causal link between an 
alleged unconstitutional act and the harm that a plaintiff claims followed 
it. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting 
that causation is a necessary element to a section 1983 claim). As the 
District Court noted, Appellants failed to produce any evidence that 
Scheer lied to Maser or attempted to convince Dr. Henretig to lie in his 
report of suspected abuse. See Miller II, 1997 WL 476352, at *4. 
Although there was ample opportunity, Appellants did not depose either 
Dr. Henretig or Solicitor Maser, both of whom would have had direct 
knowledge of any misstatements or misdeeds by Scheer. Moreover, 
Solicitor Maser spoke independently with Dr. Henretig to ascertain his 
opinion. This conversation should have served to expose any lies on the 
part of Scheer. In sum, any subsequent misstatements by Maser to the 
Judge during their telephone hearing would not have been caused by 
Scheer. 
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Cir. 1996); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 
1986) (recognizing the "legitimate expectations of the 
parents or other caretakers, protected by the fourteenth 
amendment, that their familial relationship will not be 
subject to unwarranted state intrusion"). To determine 
whether this right has been abridged, we must consider the 
governmental acts in question. 
 
"The touchstone of due process is the protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976 (1974). 
In cases like this, where abusive action by a member of the 
executive branch is alleged, "only the most egregious official 
conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional 
sense." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 
1716 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). To generate liability, executive action must be so 
ill-conceived or malicious that it "shocks the conscience." 
Id. at 1717 (citing, inter alia, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 172-73, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209-10 (1952)). Critically, 
under this standard, officials will not be held liable for 
actions that are merely negligent. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 
1718. 
 
Although the "shocks the conscience" standard is 
problematic standing alone, it serves to "mark the 
beginning point in asking whether or not the objective 
character of certain conduct is consistent with our 
traditions, precedents, and historical understanding of the 
Constitution and its meaning." See id. at 1722 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). The exact degree of wrongfulness necessary 
to reach the "conscience-shocking" level depends upon the 
circumstances of a particular case. In Lewis, wherein the 
parents of a motorcyclist who was killed in the course of a 
high speed chase by police alleged a due process violation 
by the police, the Supreme Court reviewed the standards 
that determine the liability of government actors in varying 
circumstances. Recognizing that negligence alone was never 
enough, the Court observed that activity "at the other end 
of the culpability spectrum" was more likely to lead to 
liability, but also recognized that liability may arise from 
the mid-range of culpability measurement. See id. 
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The Court compared the position of prison officials, who 
risk liability when they act with deliberate indifference to a 
prisoner's medical needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976), with the position of the 
police involved in the high-speed chase of the motorcyclist. 
The Court noted the vast differences in the circumstances 
surrounding the two types of executive actions: 
 
       [I]n the custodial situation of a prison, forethought 
       about an inmate's welfare is not only feasible but 
       obligatory under a regime that incapacitates a prisoner 
       to exercise ordinary responsibility for his own welfare. 
 
       . . . 
 
       [But] indifference may well not be enough for liability in 
       the different circumstances of a case like this one. We 
       have, indeed, found that deliberate indifference does 
       not suffice for constitutional liability (albeit under the 
       Eighth Amendment) even in prison circumstances 
       when a prisoner's claim arises not from normal 
       custody but from response to a violent disturbance. 
 
118 S. Ct. at 1719. 
 
Therefore, "[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in one 
environment may not be so patently egregious in another," 
id. at 1718, and the circumstances of each case are critical. 
A much higher fault standard is proper when a government 
official is acting instantaneously and making pressured 
decisions without the ability to fully consider their risks. In 
such instances, liability will only be applied when a 
"purpose to cause harm" is demonstrated. Id. at 1720. 
 
We recognize that a social worker acting to separate 
parent and child does not usually act in the hyper- 
pressurized environment of a prison riot or a high-speed 
chase. However, he or she rarely will have the luxury of 
proceeding in a deliberate fashion, as prison medical 
officials can. As a result, in order for liability to attach, a 
social worker need not have acted with the "purpose to 
cause harm," but the standard of culpability for substantive 
due process purposes must exceed both negligence and 
deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence 
or arbitrariness that indeed "shocks the conscience." 
 
                                11 
  
In Croft, 103 F.3d at 1123, we considered governmental 
intervention into the parent-child relationship. Based on a 
telephoned accusation, a social worker threatened to 
remove a child from the home if the father himself did not 
leave. By threatening this action, the social worker 
effectively removed the child from the parents' custody. This 
was done even though the social worker did not have 
grounds to believe that the child had been abused or was 
in imminent danger of being abused. See id. at 1126-27. 
Indeed, the social worker was acting solely on the basis of 
a sixth-level hearsay statement and had not personally 
formed an opinion as to whether abuse was likely. Breaking 
the parent-child bond under these circumstances, we held, 
was an arbitrary abuse of government power. See id. at 
1127. 
 
Although the plaintiffs argue that some of our language 
in Croft can be interpreted to sound in negligence, the 
holding may not be read to suggest that mere negligence by 
a social worker will violate a parent's or a child's 
substantive due process right. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 
1718 ("[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is 
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due 
process."). Croft assessed liability when a social worker 
acted to separate parent and child without any valid basis 
for doing so. In other words, decision-making by a social 
worker that is so clearly arbitrary, as was that in Croft, can 
properly be said to "shock the conscience" and, therefore, 
violates the substantive due process rights of the affected 
family. Thus, to the extent that Appellants claimed a 
violation of their due process rights because Scheer acted 
negligently or lacked objectively reasonable grounds to 
pursue the case against them (and their appeal indeed 
focuses on this issue), they did not state a valid claim.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we determine that Appellants' argument on appeal does not 
assert a valid claim of a constitutional violation, we do not reach the 
issue of qualified immunity. While Appellants' original complaint may be 
construed to assert that Scheer acted without any grounds for doing so, 
their appeal focuses on the application of Croft and argues that its 
holding "require[s] inquiry into the reasonableness of the actions of the 
social worker." Appellants' Brief at 23. 
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Viewing the facts adduced against Scheer in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, Scheer asked the children 
leading questions when he first visited their day care center 
in response to allegations of abuse. He requested that Miller 
produce her three children for examination at the hospital 
even though he suspected that only one of the children was 
being abused. He met in secret with a hospital social 
worker. He excluded Deratzian from the area outside the 
examination room. Though he was informed by Dr. 
Henretig that Henretig could not be sure whether Corey 
received his bruises accidentally or whether he was 
physically abused, Scheer still called City Solicitor Maser so 
that she could seek a restraining order for the children. A 
Child Advocate Social Worker thought, based on Henretig's 
statements, that the children would be allowed to go home 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We reject the City's argument that, based on our recent decision in 
Ernst v. Child & Youth Services, 108 F.3d 486, 494 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 
118 S. Ct. 139 (1997), Scheer is absolutely immune for his actions. This 
case is distinguishable from Ernst. Absolute immunity protects 
government officials for certain acts they perform that are closely 
associated to the judicial process. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 
409, 430, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976). In Ernst, we held that social 
workers were absolutely immune "for their actions on behalf of the state 
in preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting dependency hearings." Ernst, 
108 F.3d at 495. The immunity extended to "the formulation and 
presentation of recommendations to the court in the course of such 
proceedings." Id. We reasoned that "the functions performed by [child 
social workers] in dependency proceedings are closely analogous to the 
functions performed by prosecutors in criminal proceedings." Id. 
 
The District Court found that Scheer's "alleged tortious conduct . . . 
took place during the investigative phase of the child custody 
proceeding." See Miller I, 954 F. Supp. at 1063. As we recognized in 
Ernst, absolute immunity does not extend to investigative or 
administrative acts. See 108 F.3d at 497 n.7. Here, Scheer passed the 
information he had gathered on to Solicitor Maser. Maser also gathered 
information from other sources, including Dr. Henretig and social worker 
Jackson, and then presented the evidence she had to the Judge. Scheer 
made no presentations or recommendations to the court. As a result, 
Scheer's acts were not analogous to those court-related functions 
normally performed by a prosecutor, and at times performed by social 
workers, and he cannot receive absolute immunity. 
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following the doctor's examination. Finally, Scheer received 
reviews in his DHS personnel evaluations indicating that he 
had problems with co-workers and did not always follow 
proper procedures. 
 
We conclude that, even if all of the facts alleged above 
were true, Scheer did not act in a way that shocks the 
conscience. Scheer's progress reports are inapposite to his 
mindset in this case, and the social worker's statements 
were based solely on the doctor's opinion following the 
examination. In contrast, substantial evidence indicated 
that Scheer reasonably believed that the children were in 
danger of abuse, including the day care center's videotapes 
of bruises on Corey, Dr. Henretig's opinion, and the lengthy 
history of Corey's abuse by Schill. In a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must 
produce some (that is, more than a "scintilla" of) evidence 
in support of his position. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986) 
(noting that "[t]his is true even where the evidence is likely 
to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the 
plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery"). 
On these facts, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to 
state a viable substantive due process claim.7 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we will affirm because the Appellants' procedural 
due process rights were not violated and because 
Appellants have not pointed to sufficient evidence of the 
predicate conscience-shocking behavior to support a 
substantive due process claim. Finally, there was no error 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Plaintiffs also contend on appeal that the District Court erred by 
making credibility judgments in its summary judgment ruling. 
Specifically, they argue that the District Court should not have 
determined that the actions of Scheer were reasonable or made in good 
faith. We reject this argument summarily. As discussed above, plaintiffs 
proffered no evidence of acts by Scheer that rose to a level of 
arbitrariness that shocks the conscience and therefore failed to state the 
kind of deprivation that might rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation. 
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in the District Court's construction of Scheer's behavior in 
this case. 
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